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Abstract 
The paper aims at analyzing the international legal aspects of the use of force; adducing the role and functions of the UN Security Council 
and the General Assembly in preserving international peace; illustrating impediments resulted from the application of right to veto by the 
UN Security Council permanent members in the course of decision making process in the Security Council; demonstrating the difference 
between threat to peace and armed attack, whether the use of force is justified in cases of threats to peace; what are the criteria for the right 
of defense; defining the criteria of necessity and proportionality of the use of force; whether armed attack from a non-state actor could 
serve as grounds for exercising a right of self-defense; determining the act of aggression within the scope of international law; based on 
the legal aspects of the use of force and criteria for it, author explores the Russian aggression against Georgia.
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Introduction
Among the most problematic and critical issues of in-
ternational law is the legal aspects of the use of force. In 
the international legal system, It remains imperative to ask 
– “When is it lawful to use force?”. 
The decision on the use of force is made only by the 
United Nations. In some cases, however, the UN Security 
Council may give authority to international regional or-
ganizations to use force. 
The issue of the use of force became even more crucial 
after the war in August of 2008, when Russia conducted 
an act of aggression against the sovereign state of Georgia, 
in violation of fundamental principles of the international 
law. 
The international legal system was incapable of pre-
venting the states to use force against each other, due to the 
lack of effective means to protect and enforce international 
legal norms.
Legal basis of the use of force in accordance with the 
united nations charter and decision-making mecha-
nism
Legal basis of the use of force in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter 
When dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, and acts of aggression the UN Security Council 
acts under Chapter VII, the Security Council shall deter-
mine what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
Should the Security Council consider the aforementioned 
measures are inadequate, it may take such action by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or re-
store international peace and security. 
In order to contribute to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security all members of the United Na-
tions, make their armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including  rights of passage available to the Security Coun-
cil, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement 
or agreements, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security.
As far as it concerns the use of force for self-defense, 
in every concrete case fundamental criteria has to be met: 
the use of force for self-defense should not be arbitrary; use 
of force should be an absolute necessity; the aim of such a 
defensive force should be to halt or repel an attack (Gray, 
2004, pp.98-101); and no other practical alternative should 
be visible when the use of force deems necessary. 
In its decision concerning the Oil Platforms case, the 
International Court of Justice concluded that international 
law requires measures taken in self-defense to be necessary 
to reach the goal; are objective and impregnable and do not 
leave any option for discretional actions. (Case Concerning 
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.the United States 
of America), 2003).
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, use of force is 
illegal and contradicts international law if there are no ap-
propriate legal grounds for the use of force or these actions 
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are not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council 
in accordance with chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
As for definition of the use of force, the exact defini-
tion of the use of force supports development of peaceful 
bilateral relations between states. The internal legal system 
of the state gradually derailed from monopolizing the use 
of force and permits the use of force only in cases of self-
defense. Contemporary international law on use of force 
is based on the United Nations Charter. The authors of the 
Charter wished to ban any use of force but at the same 
time envisaged few exclusions which are regulated by the 
Charter. One of the reasons of creation of the UN was to 
modernize international law in the 20th century. Leaders 
decided: “To establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained, and to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to man-
kind”. (Charter of the United Nations).
In accordance with article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN 
Charter, – “all Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territori-
al integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations”. (Charter of the United Nations). Article 2, para-
graph 4 is well drafted in so far as it mentions the threat or 
use of force, but not war. The term “war” refers to a narrow 
and technical legal situation, which begins with a declara-
tion of war and ends with a peace treaty. War was generally 
prohibited before the Second World War, but states found a 
way to avoid such prohibition. For example, Japan refused 
to declare war on China and called its military operations 
in Manchuria (1932-1941) – “an incident” in order to avoid 
violating the prohibition of waging war. In light of such ex-
periences, the term “use of force” was preferred because it 
covers all forms of hostilities, both nominal wars and inci-
dents falling short of an official state of war, which ranges 
from minor border clashes to extensive military operations. 
Therefore, the prohibition of the use of force is not depend-
ent on how the involved states prefer to define their mili-
tary conflict. (Värk, 2003, pp.29-30). 
The provision stipulates that the members of the Unit-
ed Nations should refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. Does this truly mean that 
the prohibition is conditional, and force can be used for a 
wide variety of purposes because it is not aimed against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state? 
Could this line of reasoning be used to justify humanitar-
ian interventions as well as other “altruistic” uses of force? 
These clauses were never intended to restrict the scope of 
prohibition on the use of force, but, on the contrary, they 
purposed to give more specific guarantees to small states. 
Therefore, they cannot be interpreted to have a qualifying 
effect. (Brownlie, 1963, p.268).
Exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of 
force exist under the United Nations Charter: individual 
and collective self-defense; Security Council enforcement 
actions; use of force on the territory of another state upon 
request of the latter. Thus, use of force means the use of 
force in any form. The legality of the use of force is deter-
mined by the exceptions in provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter.
The Role of the Security Council
The excuse of self-defense has often been used by ag-
gressors bent on scoring propaganda points. Brutal armed 
attacks have taken place while the attacking state sancti-
moniously assured world public opinion that it was only 
responding with counter-force to the (mythical) use of 
force by the other side. If every State were the final arbiter 
of the legality of its own acts, if every state could cloak an 
armed attack with the disguise of self-defense, the inter-
national legal endeavor to hold force in check would have 
been an exercise in futility. (Dinstein, 2005, p.111).
According to the chapter 7 of the United Nations Char-
ter the Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. 
Threat to the peace is a much broader concept than an 
armed attack (Greenwood, 2002, Hein Online database). 
The difference between the two categories relates to the 
consequences ensuing thereof. Whereas any State or group 
of States can forcibly respond to an armed attack by invok-
ing the right of individual or collective self-defense, only 
the Security Council can put in motion measures of collec-
tive security that (in the Council’s judgment) are called for 
in the face of a threat to the peace. (Dinstein, 2005, p.286).
The UN Security Council resolution N1540 affirms 
that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons and their means of delivery represent a threat to inter-
national peace and security. (Security Council Resolution 
N1540 on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, 2004).
 In addition, the UN Security Council could perceive 
the violation of human rights even without the use of force 
as a threat to peace. (Gill T.D., 1995, p.150).  The Security 
Council is responsible to determine whether threat to the 
peace is viable.  
The UN Security Council is a political body, not a le-
gal one, and its decisions are based on political views rath-
er than on purely legal ones. No important decision can be 
made without support of the five permanent members (the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, 
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China, and Russian Federation) of the Council, including 
issues concerning threats to the peace. Consequentially, if 
one of the permanent members of the council is against 
reaching an agreement, it could hamper or block the pro-
cess and make the Council incapable of acting on main-
taining peace and security. 
Security Council resolutions have a legally binding ef-
fect on the members of the United Nations, and they are 
obliged to follow these resolutions.  According to the ar-
ticle 48 of the UN Charter the action required to carry out 
Security Council decisions for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security shall be taken by all the Members 
of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security 
Council may determine. Such decisions shall be carried 
out directly by the Members of the United Nations and the 
actions of the appropriate international agencies of which 
they are members. (Gill T.D.,1995, p.165). 
The General Assembly 
The impasse reached by the Security Council dur-
ing the ‘Cold War’ –due to the frequent exercise of the 
veto power – became apparent shortly after the entry into 
force of the Charter. (Dinstein, 2005, p.315). In 1950, the 
General Assembly adopted a famous resolution – entitled 
‘Uniting for Peace’ – which was supposed to surmount the 
obstacles standing in the way of concerted international ac-
tion in the face of aggression:
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack 
of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in any case where there appears 
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the mat-
ter immediately with a view to making appropriate recom-
mendations to Members for collective measures, including 
in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the 
use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. If not in session at the 
time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency spe-
cial session within twenty-four hours of the request there-
fore. (General Assembly Resolution No. 377 (V)).
If the General Assembly is not in session, an “emer-
gency special session” can be convened within 24 hours, if 
requested by the vote of any seven members of the Security 
Council on the, or by request or consent of the majority 
of its members. (Resolution - “Uniting for Peace”, 1950). 
This resolution does not amend the UN Charter. (Andrassy, 
1956, pp.563, 572).  It should be noted that the Assembly 
adopts resolutions that are non-binding in nature and are 
perceived as recommendations to States. (Stone J.,1954, 
p.274). 
In its advisory opinion of 20th July, 1962, concerning 
“Certain expenses of the United Nations”, the International 
Court of Justice concluded that the Security Council is ex-
clusively authorized to obligate states with responsibilities 
deriving from the chapter 7, of the United Nations Charter. 
(Advisory  Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Na-
tions, 1962).
During the “Cold War” era, the General Assembly 
tried to “usurp the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council on quite a number of occasions”; although in re-
cent years it appears to have largely reconciled itself to tak-
ing “a secondary or silent role”. (White N.D., 1997, p.143). 
Ultimately it could be concluded that if the UN Security 
Council fails to fulfill its mandate, no other UN body can 
substitute it.  
The Concept of Self-Defense
The Right of Self-Defense and Criteria 
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court 
of Justice stated: furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight 
of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus 
its right to resort to self-defense, in accordance with Article 
51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. (Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1996).
In addition, the International Court of Justice clari-
fied that the right of self-defense should be exercised in 
extreme circumstances. (Dinstein, 2005, p.175).
Article 51 of the UN Charter states “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security...”. (Charter of the United Nations).
Therefore, article 51 of the UN Charter envisages in-
dividual as well as collective self-defense and the unim-
paired use of this right in case of armed attack. In addition, 
there are defined criteria that should be abided by when 
exercising right of self-defense. 
In its argument on a case concerning Nicaragua, the 
International Court of Justice indicated that no particu-
larity is provided for in using the right of self-defense in 
article 51 of the UN Charter. But according to the Interna-
tional Customary Law, response to armed attack should be 
proportional and necessary. (Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. the United States of America), 1986).
The international Court of Justice reaffirmed the need 
to abide by principles of proportionality and necessity 
while responding to armed attack in its decision in 2003, 
in a case concerning Oil Platforms. (Case Concerning Oil 
16
Khatuna BURKADZE
Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2):13-22,2012 ISSN:2233-3878
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States of 
America), 2003).
In fact, criteria of proportionality and necessity are 
supplemented by the third criteria of need for imminence 
of response. These requirements derive historically from 
the Caroline case. (Schmitt, 2003, p.55).
A rebellion in colonial Canada in 1837 found active 
support from American volunteers and private suppliers 
operating out of the border region in the United States. 
The steamship Caroline was involved in supplying materi-
als to rebel-occupied Navy Island. British forces from the 
Canadian side crossed the border into the United States 
and seized the Caroline. During the assault, two citizens of 
the United States were shot dead aboard the Caroline and 
one British officer was arrested for murder. (Meng, 1992, 
pp.537-538)
The United States protested the attack on the basis that 
the British had violated its sovereignty. When the Foreign 
Office replied that the action had been an appropriate ex-
ercise of self-defense,  Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, 
argued that for the self-defense to be legitimate, the Brit-
ish had to demonstrate “a necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no mo-
ment for deliberation” and the acts could not be “unreason-
able or excessive”. (Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary 
of State of the United States, to Henry S. Fox, Envoy Ex-
traordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic 
Majesty (Apr.24, 1841), 1857).
The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opin-
ion on a case concerning nuclear weapons, concluded that 
criteria of proportionality and necessity remains a require-
ment for any case of the use of force, including the use of 
force for self-defense, envisaged by article 51 of the UN 
Charter. (Legality of the Threat or Use of Force of Nuclear 
Weapons, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 1997).
In addition, the International Court of Justice, in its de-
cision on Nicaragua v. USA, concluded that, for the means 
of self-defense, the use of proportional force to repel attack 
could be established as a rule of the International Custom-
ary Law. (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Ac-
tivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United 
States of America), 1986).
The principle of necessity is based on the following 
circumstances: a) state exercises right of self-defense when 
attack is initiated by an identified state; b) force is used in 
response to attack and not in response to  any incident or 
any other action of this nature; c) all other non-forceful op-
tions are exhausted.
Thus, if diplomatic, economic, informational, judicial, 
or other courses of action might deter the threatened ac-
tion, defensive use of force by the target of the threat would 
violate article 2(4). (Schmitt, 2003, p.22). In other words, 
“force should not be considered necessary until peaceful 
measures have been found wanting or when they clearly 
would be futile”. (Schachter, 1984, p.108).
Proportionality is the fundamental component of the 
Law on the Use of Force. (Gardam, 1993, p.1). Historical-
ly, it is part of the Just War Theory. (Russel, 1975, p.160). 
The principle of proportionality limits any defensive action 
to that necessary to defeat an ongoing attack or to deter or 
pre-empt a future attack.(Schmitt, 2003, p.55).
The third requirement, drawn from Webster’s “instant” 
and “leaving no moment for deliberation” language, is im-
minence, a criterion relevant only in the case of attacks not 
yet launched. (Schmitt, 2003, p.93).
Abidance of the criteria of self-defense does not le-
gitimize the use of force, if the use of force is unlawful 
by other cause. Therefore if armed attack is illegitimate, 
there is no need to study clauses of proportionality and the 
necessity of the use of force.
Armed Attack 
Since the right of self-defense arises under Article 51 
only ‘if an armed attack occurs’, it is clear that the use of 
force in self-defense is contingent on demonstrating that 
an armed attack has taken place. As the International Court 
of Justice pronounced in 2003, in the Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (between Iran and the United States), ‘the bur-
den of proof of the facts showing the existence’ of an armed 
attack rests on the State justifying its own use of force as 
self-defense. (Case Concerning Oil Platforms, 2003).
As it is stated in the conclusion of the International 
Court of Justice concerning the case of Nicaragua “activi-
ties of military units on the other side of the international 
border” are perceived as an armed attack if they go beyond 
the scope of a border incident. (Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. the United States of America), 1986). 
Various English dictionaries suggest that an attack 
is an actual action, not merely a threat. Furthermore, we 
should take into consideration other parts of the United 
Nations Charter, namely Article 2, paragraph 4. This pro-
hibits both the actual use of force as well as the threat of 
force, and it is difficult to conceive that the drafter of the 
United Nations Charter, due to an oversight, simply forgot 
to add the words “or threatens” to Article 51. (Bothe, 2003, 
p.229). Whereas exclusion of the word “threat” in article 
51 is in compliance with the fundamental principles of the 
UN – to prevent unilateral use of force. The majority of 
scholars agree that armed attack is an active attack which 
already took place, rather than threat of such attack. (Din-
stein, 2005, pp.165-169). 
The events of September 11, 2001 triggered discus-
sions whether the armed attack referred to in article 51 of 
the UN Charter included terrorist attacks. Article 51 by it-
self, does not clarify that armed attack should be executed 
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by the state, though this provision remains vague, while 
paragraph 4, of article 2 of the same Charter allows the use 
of force in self-defense as an exception, when a state is at-
tacked by another state.
Nevertheless, if an attack was organized by a Non-
State Actor on the territory of another state, it is assumed 
that it carries as grave danger as an armed attack. The UN 
General Assembly argues in favor of this, in its resolution 
on the “Definition of Aggression”. According to the defini-
tion, acts of armed force against another state carried out 
by armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries are of 
the same gravity as armed attacks carried out by regular 
or any other permanent armed force. (Resolution on the 
Definition of Aggression, 1974).
The international Court of Justice defined this provi-
sion as a norm of International Customary Law. However, 
the UN General Assembly resolutions are not obligatory in 
their nature. (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the Unit-
ed States of America), 1986).   Such a situation can, in legal 
reasoning, be called a constructive armed attack or a situ-
ation equivalent to an armed attack. (Bothe, 2003, p.230). 
Therefore, armed attack by a Non-State Actor could serve 
as a basis for self-defense if it is of sufficient gravity and 
originated from abroad.   
The concept of constructive armed attack or a situation 
equivalent to an armed attack, is not foreign to internation-
al legal reasoning. It directs to a rather broader concept of 
self-defense and indicates that in the current environment, 
an armed attack could derive not only from states but from 
Non-State Actors. In that situation the threat came from a 
non-state group of the kind most would probably call “ter-
rorist” today. (Greenwood, 2003, p.17).
The reaction of the international community to the 
events of 11th of September 2001, explicitly illustrated the 
concept that armed attack is not limited to state actors. Af-
ter the attacks, the UN Security Council, recognized the 
right for the self-defense and immediately enshrined it in 
its two resolutions. (Security Council Resolutions about 
Threats to International Peace and Security caused by ter-
rorist acts, 2001).
UN Security Council resolutions did not clearly iden-
tify that terrorist acts are equivalent to armed attacks, but 
while recognizing the right for self-defense it had to rec-
ognize that these acts have served for enacting article 51 
of the UN Charter. The same attitude was shared by other 
international organizations. The North Atlantic Council 
agreed that this attack was directed from abroad against the 
United States and should be regarded as an action covered 
by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an 
armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all. (North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 1949).
Based on the aforementioned, it could be concluded 
that an armed attack can be conducted by another state 
or non-state actor from within a foreign state. (Dinstein, 
2005, p.187).
The Concept of Collective Self-Defense
Collective Self-Defense Treaties
The phrase ‘individual or collective self-defense’, as 
used in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is 
not easily comprehensible. A close examination of the text, 
in light of the practice of States, shows that more than a 
simple dichotomy is involved. It seems necessary to distin-
guish between no less than four categories of self-defense: 
(i) individual self-defense individually exercised; (ii) in-
dividual self-defense collectively exercised; (iii) collec-
tive self-defense individually exercised; and (iv) collec-
tive self-defense collectively exercised. (Dinstein, 2005, 
p.252).
The first category envisages individual response from 
a state when it is attacked by another. The second category 
describes a situation when the aggressor attacks multiple 
states simultaneously or successively, and attacked states 
exercise their right of self-defense.  The third category 
is the situation when in response to aggression, the right 
of self-defense is exercised by another state individually 
which was not attacked, in support of an attacked state in 
order to repel the attack. According to the UN Charter any 
state could support another, if the latter is the victim of ag-
gression. (Kelsen, 1948, pp.783-792).
In the fourth category, collective self-defense is exer-
cised collectively when two or more states are supporting 
the attacked state. In its judgment on Nicaragua, the In-
ternational Court of Justice stated that the right of collec-
tive self-defense derives not only from article 51 of the UN 
Charter, but it is a recognized norm of the International 
Customary Law. (Case Concerning Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua v. the 
United States of America), 1986).
According to article 52 of the UN Charter nothing in 
the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for addressing such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security, as is 
appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrange-
ments or agencies and their activities are consistent with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The 
Members of the United Nations entering into such arrange-
ments or constituting such agencies shall make every ef-
fort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through 
such regional arrangements, or by such regional agencies, 
before referring them to the Security Council. The Security 
Council shall encourage the development of pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements, 
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or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the 
states concerned, or by reference from the Security Coun-
cil. (Charter of the United Nations).
The word “regional” referred to in article 52 of the 
Charter, does not only refer to geographic closeness of the 
states. First and foremost the word “regional” refers to the 
countries that are united and allied in terms of their joint 
interests and relationships. (Thomas, 1956, p.178).  Each 
group of states that are in value-based unions pursue joint 
interests and work together for the maintenance of peace 
and security. (Kelsen, 1951, p.920). Regional agreements 
are agreements between two or more states. (Akehurst, 
1967, pp.175-177).  Agreements on collective defense is an 
instrument where state parties to the agreement declare that 
attack on one of them is an attack against all of them, and 
all members take the responsibility to support each other.
Collective self-defense treaties may be bilateral or 
multilateral. One example of such a bilateral treaty is the 
agreement between the USA and South Korea, which was 
concluded in 1953. (United States-Republic of Korea, 
Washington Treaty,1953). Multilateral treaties are conclud-
ed by more than two states and carry collective responsibil-
ity on collective self-defense. (Moore, 1986, pp.104-105). 
Agreements   on collective defense serve as a deterrent to 
potential threat and support development of political rela-
tions and military cooperation between the signatories.
Military Alliances
Military alliances are established based on integration 
between states; members strive for close cooperation on 
military and political issues. Alliances support develop-
ment of shared responsibilities between members. As 
usual, a cornerstone for military alliances is responsibility 
to insure the security of each other. The responsibility to 
support an allied partner if it falls victim to aggression is 
fulfilled by all members of the alliance. (Beckett, 1950). 
The main purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (established on April 4, 1949) is to safeguard the 
freedom and security of its members through political 
and military means in accordance with the United Na-
tions Charter. Solidarity and unity in day-to-day work 
within the alliance enhances cooperation in dealing with 
core security challenges. As in NATO, military alliance 
may equally rely on its large and small member states. 
All members of NATO, regardless of their size, popula-
tion and economic, political and military development, 
are equal in the decision-making process. In NATO, little 
Luxemburg can foster or block any issue with equal suc-
cess as the large and mighty the United States. (Burkadze 
Khatuna, 2008, p.8). 
The members of military alliance will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the 
parties is threatened. Members of the alliance, separately 
and jointly, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacities by mutual aid.
Legal Analysis of the Russian Aggression Against 
Georgia
Factual Circumstances – Crisis of Peace Formats and 
Occupation of Georgian Territories
After restoration of the independence of Georgia and 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the successor of the So-
viet empire – the Russian Federation – continued to incite 
armed conflicts on the territories of Georgia, namely, in 
the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Former 
Autonomous District of South Ossetia. Russian authorities 
constantly supplied the separatists with arms and provided 
them with financial, military and political support. 
Russia, in 1990s, using regular military forces and vol-
unteers committed ethnic cleansing of the Georgian popu-
lation that was recognized by the final acts of the OSCE 
summits in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, in Lisbon on 
2-3 December 1996 and in Istanbul on 18-19 November 
1999, (Budapest Summit Document 1994, 5-6 December, 
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe; Lis-
bon Summit Document 1996, 2-3 December, Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe; Istanbul Summit 
Document 1999) as well as by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution (62/249) of 15 May 2008. (Resolution of the 
UN General Assembly, 2008).  Since then, the Russian 
Federation has constantly used every possible means to 
provoke intensification of the conflicts through so-called 
peacekeeping forces.
In 2007-2008, Georgian authorities and the Inter-
national Community made steps aimed at settling the 
so-called frozen conflicts and providing a genuine envi-
ronment for internationalization of the peace process as 
approved in Resolutions N1781 and N 1752 of UN Secu-
rity Council. (Resolution of Security Council, October 15, 
2007;  Resolution of Security Council, April 13, 2007). 
Russia responded with military aggression. 
Despite the peace initiatives of the Georgian authori-
ties on 7 August 2008 Russia manifestly engaged itself into 
conflict on the territory of Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia 
and carried out a wide military intervention in the terri-
tory of Georgia.  Russian regular troops attacked not only 
Georgian military units but also civilian infrastructure and 
the peaceful population, resulting in the entire destruc-
tion of settlements in the conflict zone. (Resolution of the 
Parliament of Georgia on the Occupation of the Georgian 
Territories by the Russian Federation, 2008). In parallel, 
the Russian armed forces, including its air force, attacked 
the territory of Upper Abkhazia and occupied it in viola-
tion of international agreements and UN Security Council 
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resolutions. Bombardments occurred throughout the entire 
territory of Georgia. (Address of the Parliament of Georgia 
to the International Community, 2008). Presently, 20% of 
Georgian territory is occupied.
The Council of Europe clearly noted in its Resolution 
N1633 (2008) that in August 2008 “the Russian Federa-
tion occupied significant parts of Georgian territory. In ad-
dition, on March 4, 2009, the “European Commission for 
Democracy through Law” (also known as the Venice Com-
mission) confirmed that: “the presence of military forces 
of any other state on the territory of Georgia, without an 
explicit and voluntary consent expressed by the state of 
Georgia, shall be deemed illegal military occupation of the 
Territory of a sovereign country”. (Report by the Govern-
ment of Georgia on the aggression by the Russian Federa-
tion against Georgia, 2009).
It is a fact, that Russia is the party to the conflict, and 
this has been reflected in documents of the Council of Eu-
rope, European Union and NATO, all of these documents 
request to refuse illegitimate recognition of Georgian re-
gions. (Alexidze, 2009, p.117). Consequently, the process 
of turning Russia from a proclaimed mediator into party to 
the conflict is irreversible.
Legal Assessment – the Use of Force by the Russian 
Federation Against Georgia as an Act of Aggression
In contemporary international law legal regulations on 
the use of force derive from the UN Charter and norms 
of international customary law. Russia’s use of force was 
not authorized by the United Nations Security Council and 
cannot qualify as a lawful exercise on the right of self-
defense. It is self-evident that Russian Federation forces 
invaded and occupied Georgian territory in violation of 
numerous international legal norms. 
Russia invaded and occupied Georgia in the absence 
of an international legal justification of the action. Nor is 
the Russian invasion justified under the terms of the so-
called humanitarian intervention and use of force abroad 
to protect nationals; in reality, according to international 
law, this was a typical act of aggression. On the other hand, 
while talking about protection of nationals abroad, one has 
to give a legal assessment to the illegal process of the dis-
tribution of Russian passports. While acting in the capacity 
of a peacekeeper, Russia forced inhabitants of the conflict 
zone to change their citizenship into Russian. Even in the-
ory, Russia did not have the right to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Georgia and use military force the UN General 
Assembly resolution on the principles of International Law 
declares: “states or group of states have a duty not to in-
tervene in matters within the internal or foreign affairs of 
any state”. (Resolution of General Assembly, 1970).  Inter-
ference in the internal or foreign affairs of any country is 
considered a violation of international law.
In practice and theory of contemporary international 
law, in order for military intervention to fall under the de-
scription of humanitarian intervention,  exact precondi-
tions and criteria must be met (humanitarian intervention 
– military, economic or other enforcement actions used by 
international organization(s) against a state committing 
massive and  gross violations of  human rights). (Alexidze, 
L., 2003, p.415). The international community univocally 
confirmed that Russian aggression does not satisfy any 
preconditions and criteria in order to be qualified as hu-
manitarian intervention. In the opinion of Levan Alexidze, 
Professor of International Law, Russia’s military interven-
tion against Georgia was markedly “revanchist”. (Alexidze 
L., 2008, p.185).
Professor Alexidze reiterates that since the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union Russian foreign policy is aimed 
at maintaining influence over former Soviet republics 
and preventing their integration into European structures. 
(Alexidze, L., 2008, p.185 ).  Russia’s main goal was not 
the “protection of own nationals abroad”, it intended to 
conduct a large scale military operation on the territory of 
Georgia and infringe on the sovereignty of Georgia.
Additionally, Russia can not appeal to the right of pro-
tecting its peacekeepers in the Tskhinvali region/South Os-
setia, there is no general right to use force in support of 
or for the protection of national peacekeeping contingents. 
The status and protection accorded to peacekeepers under 
international law are valid under international law, as long 
as the peacekeepers remain neutral; this status is removed 
and protection is lifted automatically when they participate 
in the hostilities. The argument in support of the use of 
force for the protection of peacekeepers is weakened by 
the fact that Georgia’s defense operation started hours after 
the Russian invasion and no military clash between Geor-
gian forces and peacekeepers had occurred before this. On 
the contrary, before the large scale Russian invasion, the 
civilian population and Georgian peacekeepers deployed 
in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, and their checkpoints 
had been attacked throughout the week before August 7. 
(Report by the Government of Georgia on the aggression 
by the Russian Federation against Georgia, 2009, p.105).
In the authoritative definition  of Aggression, Resolu-
tion 3314 (1974) where the General Assembly enumerated 
acts that constitute acts of aggression, which include: “The 
invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the ter-
ritory of another state, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack… bom-
bardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory 
of another state or the use of any weapons by a state against 
the territory of another state; the blockade of the ports or 
coasts of a state by the armed forces of another state”. The 
same resolution in article 5 indicates: “No consideration 
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military 
or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression; 
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a war of aggression is a crime against international peace. 
Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.” 
(Resolution on the Definition of Aggression (adopted by 
the General Assembly), 1974).
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 falls 
squarely within this definition and therefore meets the re-
quirements of the crime. Russia violated the sovereignty 
of Georgia, infringed on its territorial integrity, bombarded 
Georgian cities and turned Georgia into a “target of oc-
cupation”. As in article 5 of the General Assembly Resolu-
tion on the Definition of Aggression, nothing may serve as 
justification for aggression. 
Irrefutably, the official declaration of Russia, that 
military intervention into Georgia and bombardment of 
Georgian cities was imminent and necessary to “rescue” 
Ossetians, is deficient of any legal base.  At same time, 
Russian actions do not subscribe to the criteria of propor-
tionality and necessity. As it’s constituted by the interna-
tional community, Russia never tried to use means other 
than military force. In fact, Russia hampered all political 
negotiations and the force it used was disproportionate 
and inconsistent. (Statement of  the North Atlantic Coun-
cil at the level of Foreign Ministers, 2008; Report by the 
Government of Georgia on the aggression by the Russian 
Federation against Georgia, 2009). Russia targeted all key 
military and civilian sites, artificially widened the military 
front and involved territories that had nothing to do with 
the conflict zones. Russian military actions that started as 
an operation for protecting nationals abroad turned into a 
punishment campaign aimed at occupying the entire terri-
tory of Georgia.
On June 1, 2010, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithu-
ania passed a resolution on the Situation in Georgia. Ac-
cording to this resolution the Parliament of Lithuania as-
sesses the presence of Russian troops on Georgian territory 
and the actions of the proxy regimes of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as an illegal occupation of parts of Georgian terri-
tory and a gross violation of the norms of international law. 
(Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution on the 
Situation in Georgia, 2010). The Seimas of the Republic of 
Lithuania is the first national parliament which legally used 
the term occupation in respect to the conflict regions of 
Georgia. In addition, the resolution calls on the Lithuanian 
President and the Government to be guided by the resolu-
tion principles in the process of carrying out foreign policy.
Conclusion
Over the years, legal regulation of the use of force 
has transformed dramatically, starting from the doctrine of 
“Just War” continuing with the full freedom of the use of 
force in the XVII-XX centuries, and concluding with the 
general prohibition of the use of force in the United Na-
tions Charter. However, the UN Charter has accepted the 
use of force in individual or collective self-defense and has 
authorized the UN Security Council to make decisions on 
enforcement actions. 
As far as, the definition of self-defense is concerned 
a few points must be considered. First – any state has the 
right of self-defense in case of actual attack from another 
state. Secondly, a state cannot use the right of preventive 
self-defense to deal with threat that is still probable and 
likely to occur in the future. The Security Council is to “de-
termine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression” and states do not have the 
right to do the same individually or in parallel. Thirdly, 
article 51 of the UN Charter includes a general provision 
on armed attack and ignores the subject of an attack, thus 
prompting to question whether a state can exercise the right 
of self-defense if threat derives not from another state? The 
international reaction to the events of September 11,  2001, 
confirms that the concept of armed attack is not limited 
to state actions. The right of self-defense can be exercised 
when threat derives from a Non-State Actor too. But in or-
der to be clear on the definition of self-defense, perhaps 
this provision should go as follows: “Nothing in the pre-
sent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs by another 
state or Non-State Actor from within a foreign state …” 
(Burkadze, 2008, pp. 28-29). Despite the fact that the cri-
teria of necessity and proportionality is valid for any case 
of the use of force, it is not indicated in article 51 of the 
UN Charter and it is the part of the international customary 
law. The third criteria for the use of force in self-defense 
from Webster’s formula connotes response to actions that 
are instant, overwhelming, leave no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation.
The inability of the UN Security Council to insure 
effective protection of international peace and security 
increases the importance of the collective self-defense 
agreements. Bilateral and multilateral treaties on collective 
defense is an instrument where state parties to the agree-
ment declare that attack on one of them is an attack against 
all of them, and all members take the responsibility to sup-
port each other. As in article 51 of the charter to the right 
of collective self-defense, as in the individual one, materi-
alizes in the case of actual armed attack, and lasts till the 
Security Council takes appropriate measures. 
In conclusion, in cases of gross violations of inter-
national law, as in the case of Russian aggression against 
Georgia in August 2008 up until now, states are obliged to 
cooperate in order to prevent violations in a lawful manner, 
do not legitimize realities created due to those violations 
and facilitate the creation of a common principal position 
on the unacceptability of forceful actions against states, in 
particular against small states, that are in breach of  inter-
national law and principals of justice.
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